Community-scale Flood Risk Management: Effects of a Voluntary National Program on Migration and Development by Noonan, Douglas S. & Sadiq, Abdul-Akeem
Community-scale Flood Risk Management: Effects of a Voluntary National Program on 
Migration and Development 
Douglas S. Noonan, Abdul-Akeem Sadiq 
1. Introduction
Floods remain the most destructive natural hazard worldwide in terms of lives lost, 
property damage, and economic impact (Jonkman, 2005; Sadiq & Noonan, 2015a). For example, 
in 2012, flood victims1 accounted for 53% of all victims of natural disasters worldwide (Guha-
Sapir, Hoyois, & Below, 2013). Moreover, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) has predicted increases in the frequency and intensity of heavy precipitation events and 
melting of glacier ice (IPCC, 2013). Against the backdrop of future increase in climate change-
induced flood risks, flooding is likely to continue to wreak havoc on ecological and human 
systems (Botzen et al., 2009; IPCC, 2013). How we collectively address these challenges to 
community resilience is becoming increasingly important in the face of changing risks and 
urbanization.  
Understanding and improving flood management at the community scale (i.e., levels 
larger than the individual or household, but smaller than regions, states, or nations) is important 
in order to reduce the vulnerability of human societies to floods (Li & Landry, 2018). Floods do 
not just occur at the micro or household level; larger scales matter for floods and flood risk. 
Externalities from land-use decisions that can affect others’ flood risks (e.g., developing natural 
infrastructure like wetlands, expanding impervious surfaces) and incentives to free-ride on public 
infrastructure provision (e.g., information provision, open-space preservation, drainage systems, 
levees) imply that individual-level decision-making can lead to socially suboptimal flood 
management. Individual or firm decisions to develop wetlands or add impervious surfaces 
(Kousky & Zeckhauser, 2006), reduce tree cover (Pramova et al., 2012), install non-levees 
embankments (Olson & Morton, 2013), or develop barrier islands and coastal dunes (Reddy, 
2000) can cumulate and affect others’ flood risks (Kousky, 2010). Left to laissez-faire individual 
decision-making, many larger infrastructure projects face public goods problems (Greaves & 
Penning-Rowsell, 2016; Li & Landry, 2018; Reddy, 2000) that make optimal provision a 
challenge. Accordingly, some local governments engage in various flood-risk management 
activities to overcome collective-action problems in providing infrastructure and addressing 
externalities. Although, some studies have examined flood management at a meso-level like the 
community scale (e.g., Brody, Zahran, Highfield, Bernhardt, & Vedlitz, 2009; Sadiq & Noonan, 
2015a, 2015b), these studies do not analyze the impact of a flood-risk management policy on 
migration and development. 
We address this lacuna by studying the impact of the Community Ratings System (CRS), 
a federal program (implemented at the city or county scale to induce flood-risk management), on 
migration and development. There is ample reason to be concerned about migration and 
development in high-risk areas, and the extent to which public policies exacerbate this. For 
example, in the U.S., the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) is often criticized for 
encouraging risky and ecologically harmful development in floodplains, thus leading to 
increased flood disaster impacts (e.g., Bagstad, Stapleton, & D’Agostino, 2007; Burby, 2001; 
Chakraborty, Collins, Montgomery, & Grineski, 2014; Cordes & Yezer, 1998; Thomas & 
1 Victims include those killed, presumed dead, missing, injured, homeless, or requiring immediate assistance. 
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Leichenko, 2011). Similarly, in Brazil, Sant'Anna’s (2018) study found that government policies 
could exacerbate disaster impacts.  
In order to stem the destruction engendered by flood events, the United States 
government created the CRS program in 1990 to enable communities to surpass the expectations 
of the NFIP and voluntarily reduce flood risks (Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA), 2017). In return, participating communities receive discounted flood insurance 
premiums (FEMA, 2017). Although inducing community-level flood-management actions is a 
first-order objective of the CRS, the second-order effects on economic activity like migration and 
development are crucial to fully assessing the net effects of the CRS. Despite the myriad studies 
on the CRS—the determinants of community participation in the CRS (Landry & Li, 2012; 
Noonan, Richardson, & Sadiq, 2018; Sadiq & Noonan, 2015a), the use of the CRS as a measure 
of adaptive capacity of municipal leaders to engage in collective action (Posey, 2009), policy 
learning (Brody et al., 2009), the characteristics of communities that are behaving strategically to 
take advantage of the incentive structure of the CRS (Sadiq & Noonan, 2015b), the effects of the 
CRS on flood-insurance demand (Dixon, Clancy, Seabury, & Overton, 2006; Zahran, Weiler, 
Brody, Lindell, & Highfield, 2009), and flood-insurance claims (Kousky & Michel-Kerjan, 
2015)—the effect of subsidizing community-level flood management on migration and 
development patterns remains unstudied. Hence, we address this research gap by analyzing the 
effects of the CRS on migration and development at the tract level. Using panel data (1970–
2010), we estimate fixed-effects (FE) regressions with robust standard errors clustered by group. 
The findings will benefit both academics and practitioners, especially those evaluating the 
effectiveness of the CRS program.  
In the following section, we discuss some background information on the CRS, review 
relevant literature, and our hypotheses. Next, we outline the methodology, including detailed 
information about the data, and discuss the results. Finally, we conclude by discussing the 
implications of our results and outlining an agenda for future research on flood-risk management. 
 
2. Background on the CRS 
 
Since its inception in 1968, the NFIP has aspired to reduce the impact of flooding on 
public and private infrastructures, provide affordable insurance to property owners, and promote 
the development of flood protection activities in communities throughout the United States 
(FEMA, 2017). The NFIP is an initiative between federal and state governments, private 
insurance companies, and local communities with the goal of reducing flood disasters by 
enacting and enforcing floodplain-management activities in flood-prone areas (Dixon et al., 
2006). According to the Department of Homeland Security (2013), the NFIP reduces flood-
related disaster cost by $1.7 billion annually. Despite this reduction, disaster cost is on the 
increase (Noonan & Sadiq, 2018). To reduce further the impacts and costs of flood disasters, 
FEMA implemented the CRS in 1990 to allow communities to implement flood reduction 
measures beyond what is required under the NFIP (FEMA, 2017). Indeed, the CRS is a voluntary 
program designed to incentivize communities—cities or counties—to engage in additional flood-
management activities in order to stem the rising costs of flood disasters. The three goals of the 
CRS are to reduce flood damage to insurable property, strengthen and support the insurance 
aspects of the NFIP, and foster comprehensive floodplain management (FEMA, 2017). When 
communities develop flood-management activities that reflect these three goals, they are able to 
accumulate credit points and enjoy discounted flood-insurance premiums commensurate with 
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their total credit score (Roth & Kunreuther, 1998). As of May 2016, 1,391 communities were 
participating in the CRS, representing about 5% of NFIP participating communities (FEMA, 
2016). 
Communities participating in the CRS are organized into 10 classes based on their credit 
points (FEMA, 2017). Class 10 represents communities that do not participate or do not have the 
minimum number of credit points needed to enter the program. Class 1 represents communities 
with exceptional floodplain management activities who enjoy a 45% discount on flood insurance 
premiums if the community is in a Special Flood Hazard Area (SFHA)—a land area with a 1% 
or greater chance of flooding within any given year (FEMA, 2015). Under the NFIP, SFHAs are 
required to enact floodplain management activities and purchase flood insurance (FEMA, 2015). 
Communities in the intermediate classes receive discounted flood insurance premiums within 
SFHAs in increments of 5%. In other words, a Class 9 community receives a 5% discount, a 
Class 8 community receives a 10% discount and so on until a community reaches a Class 1 
receiving the 45% discount. CRS makes much smaller discounts (5-10%) on flood-insurance 
premiums available outside of SFHAs within participating communities.   
Credit points depend on a community’s ability to implement any of the 20 creditable 
activities that advance the CRS’s goals. These activities span four categories: public information, 
mapping and regulations, flood damage reduction, and warning and response (FEMA, 2017). 
This wide array of creditable flood management efforts ranges from information provision (e.g., 
hazard disclosure, flood insurance promotion) to planning (e.g., watershed master planning) to 
stricter regulation (e.g., building codes, zoning) to physical infrastructure provision (e.g., 
retrofitting buildings, structural flood-control projects, building levees). Similarly, maximum 
possible points awarded in each activity vary widely. Regulations and open-space preservation 
account for a third of the possible points, whereas 38% of possible points can be earned for 
damage reduction activities. Points for levees and dams are small, amounting to less than half the 
available points for public information activities (7% of total points available). Communities 
prefer some activities to others. For example, some activities (e.g., elevation certificates, 
outreach projects, flood protection information, higher regulatory standards) are undertaken by 
over 90% of participating communities, while others (e.g., flood insurance promotion, levees, 
dams) record no credits earned by any community. See FEMA (2017) for more details on the 
CRS. 
 
3. Literature Review 
 
 Few studies have examined the extent to which flood risks and flood-management efforts 
influence housing development in the U.S. Burby (2001) argues that while flood-insurance 
programs have only had a limited effect on directing development to locations outside of a 
floodplain, the NFIP standards have significantly reduced flood losses on new construction 
located in floodplains. Using Hurricane Katrina as a case study, Burby (2006) contends that 
federal policies such as the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 and the Flood Insurance Act of 1994 
and 2004 have attempted to make hazardous areas safer by investing in structural mitigation 
(e.g., dams, levees) and non-structural mitigation (e.g., flood insurance) measures. Contrarily, 
these federal programs have facilitated development in hazardous areas, which has, in turn, 
substantially increased the potential for catastrophic losses (Burby, 2006). Cordes and Yezer 
(1998) and then later Browne, Dehring, Eckles, and Lastrapes (2015) investigate the effect of 
NFIP participation on local housing development. Cordes and Yezer (1998) find that increased 
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growth in beachfront communities is not because of government investment in shore protection 
measures, but due to increased income and employment in inland communities. Browne, 
Dehring, Eckles, and Lastrapes’s (2015) study finds that participating in the NFIP leads to 
increases in housing starts and permits in inland counties and a decrease in housing starts and 
permits in coastal counties with average flood zone acreage.  
In addition to location of development, the type of housing and mitigation investments 
may be affected by flood risk and management programs. Mobile-home residents, for instance, 
are less likely to purchase flood insurance along the Gulf of Mexico and Florida’s Atlantic Coast 
(Petrolia, Landry, & Coble, 2013). However, they are not statistically different in their likelihood 
of purchasing wind insurance compared to individuals living in single-family homes (Petrolia et 
al., 2013). Less has been written on flood-management programs’ effects on building 
construction types. For example, whether the construction type changes because of flood-
management programs, remains understudied.   
 The extant research has shown that individuals use migration as a strategy for adapting to 
climate change and changing local risks. For example, Portnykh (2014) estimates a location 
choice model to show the importance of migration as a way to adapt to climate change. Boustan, 
Kahn, and Rhode (2012) study how individuals used migration as a strategy to self-protect from 
the impacts of natural disasters in the 1920s and 1930s. Their result shows that young men 
migrated from areas hit by tornadoes and relocated to areas susceptible to floods. Furthermore, 
Hornbeck and Naidu (2014) examine the impact of the Great Mississippi Flood of 1927 on out-
migration of the black population. They find immediate and persistent out-migration of blacks in 
flooded counties. In addition, Husby, Groot, Hofkes, and Dröes (2014) evaluate a flood from the 
1950s to show populations shift in response to new flood/disaster risks. Yet, how government 
flood management programs like the CRS affect migration and relocation remains unclear. 
Studies of the CRS, like Li and Landry (2014), and Zahran, Brody, Highfield, and Vedlitz 
(2010), show how population levels correlate with CRS participation rather than how CRS alters 
population growth patterns. Similarly, Sadiq and Noonan (2015a) find that counties joining the 
CRS tend to have greater shares of residents moving in years prior. However, they do not 
examine the effects on relocation tendencies after joining the CRS, nor do they allow for 
heterogeneity in migration patterns within counties.  
This study raises the question of whether the CRS attracts more development to or drive 
development away from flood risk. The CRS may theoretically both push and pull local 
development, leaving the theoretically ambiguous result a matter of empirical assessment. On the 
one hand, the CRS produces additional flood risk information. The vast environmental 
information disclosure literature (Beierle, 2004) proposes that when individuals or communities 
are aware of environmental risks, they are more likely to make better and safer decisions. For 
example, Finger and Gamper-Rabindran’s (2013) find that mandatory pollution disclosure 
programs may be responsible for reducing workers’ chemical exposure. Beierle (2004) maintains 
that information disclosure programs are fundamentally implemented with the goal of changing 
behavior. This view is germane to the CRS because the CRS is partly an information-based 
policy: eight out of 20 creditable activities under the CRS are related to public information. 
Public information activities are supposed to encourage individuals within CRS participating 
communities to make better decisions. For example, knowing that a particular home is located in 
a floodplain might change the mind of a prospective home buyer from buying that particular 
home. Furthermore, the CRS encourages stricter building regulations and community restrictions 
on locations and types of new construction (Browne et al., 2015). Once better informed and 
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facing costlier housing, households may “head for the hills” and away from risky settlements. 
Thus, we offer the following hypotheses.  
On the other hand, CRS incentives may encourage more development or at least 
discourage departures. There is ample evidence suggesting that community risk mitigation 
programs such as the CRS can be successful at reducing community flood risk (e.g., Sadiq & 
Noonan, 2015a, 2015b) and future property damage (Brody, Zahran, Maghelal, Grover, & 
Highfield, 2007; Brody, Zahran, Highfield, Grover, & Vedlitz, 2008). If such programs are not 
properly designed, however, they can create perverse incentives that could undermine the 
intended programmatic benefits (Sadiq & Noonan, 2015b; Zahran et al., 2010). Moreover, there 
is evidence that poorly designed flood risk programs actually encourage development of homes 
in flood-prone areas. Burby (2001) notes that within 30 years of passing the NFIP, development 
within 100-year floodplains rose by 53%. Chakraborty et al. (2014) suggest that flood subsidies 
heightened housing development in flood-prone coastal communities. In addition, Bagstad et al. 
(2007) argue that the NFIP has encouraged development in flood zones by providing subsidies to 
community members. In short, subsidizing development in flood-prone areas can lead to 
perverse outcomes, especially if flood-insurance premiums are not commensurate with the 
inherent flood risk (Burby, 2001). The CRS increases subsidies for flood insurance in SFHAs. 
Thus, the hypotheses below might plausibly be rejected depending on which influence of the 
CRS is stronger: its “scarecrow” effects of discouraging development in high-risk areas, or its 
subsidy effects of encouraging development in high-risk areas. 
 
H1a: Tracts in CRS communities have less new housing construction (or population 
growth) than non-CRS tracts.  
H1b: Tracts in CRS communities have more new housing construction (or population 
growth) than non-CRS tracts. 
H2a: Tracts in CRS communities have fewer mobile homes or trailers than non-CRS 
tracts.  
H2b: Tracts in CRS communities have more mobile homes or trailers than non-CRS 
tracts.  
H3a: Tracts in CRS communities have more non-movers than non-CRS tracts.  
H3b: Tracts in CRS communities have fewer non-movers than non-CRS tracts.  
 
Finally, the literature provides the empirical justification for relevant variables to include 
in the analysis. The idea is to control for variables that might make a community join the CRS 
and affect migration or development. Control variables include the tract-level poverty rate and 
unemployment rate. Indicators like these may correlate with CRS participation (Li & Landry, 
2014; Posey, 2009) while also affecting subsequent migration and development in the tract. 
Controls for vacancy rates, rentership rates, and mean housing values capture the conditions of 
the tract's housing stock. Sadiq and Noonan (2015a) find housing values and homeownership 
rates to be positive and significant predictors of CRS participation. Likewise, Bollens, Kaiser, 
and Burby (1989) find a positive correlation between cities’ housing values and floodplain 
programs. The share of the county that lived in the same house five years prior also helps control 
for rapidly transitioning markets.  
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4.  Methodology 
To explore the drivers of migration and development, a straightforward and parsimonious 
model is estimated for a national panel of tract-level observations over several decades (1970-
2010). The empirical models estimate factors influencing several alternative measures of 
migration and development, with the same basic specification shared across each of the 
alternative dependent variables. The panel data allow an estimation of a fixed-effects regression 
model with robust standard errors clustered by group, where “group” in this context refers to the 
census tract as our local unit of observation. Our analysis addresses the concern over possible 
endogeneity issues in three ways. First, we use a fixed-effect model to help control for any time-
invariant unobservable factors that might lead to endogeneity. Second, our unit of analysis is 
tract-level and the policy treatment is at the community-level. Our argument is that individual 
tracts lack ‘market power’ and cannot influence the local jurisdiction’s adoption choice—the 
decision to participate or not to participate in the CRS can only be made at the county or city 
level. Moreover, the average CRS community contains 190 tracts. Finally, we control for a host 
of time-varying attributes such as poverty rates that might affect migration or development. 
 
The empirical model thus takes the form: 
 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜌𝜌𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖) + 𝜎𝜎𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−10 + 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
Where i indexes tracts, and t indexes census years (1980, 1990, 2000, 2010). The variable y 
measures population and housing outcomes. CRS is the variable of interest, a dummy variable 
reflecting whether the tract was in a community participating in the CRS in year t. The vector X 
includes tract-level socioeconomic controls, all lagged by ten years. The vectors Risk and 
Damage describe flood risks and recent flood property damage, respectively. Notably, the Risk 
vector contains time-invariant measures, although its interaction term with CRS remains time-
varying. Year effects (τ), estimated as coefficients of year dummy variables, and tract-level fixed 
effects (μ) are also in the model, in addition to the white-noise error term (ε). The presence of 
tract fixed-effects leaves ρ unidentified, and the model to be estimated becomes:  
 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖) + 𝜎𝜎𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−10 + 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
4.1 Data 
 
In order to examine the impact of the CRS on migration and development, we merged 
five different data sources together (see Table 1). The first data source is CRS participation from 
FEMA from 2000 and 2010. The data contain information about participating communities such 
as name, place, and year of participation. The second data source is the Neighborhood Change 
Database (NCDB) from Geolytics, Inc., which contains US Census information. This study uses 
census information at the census tract level, normalized to use time-consistent 2010 tract 
boundaries, for the decadal years from 1970 to 2010 (i.e., 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010). 
The NCDB contains information such as population, household income, housing characteristics, 
poverty status, employment, and housing values. 
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Table 1 
Data sources. 
Data Unit Years Available Information 
1. CRS Participation from 
FEMA (2017) 
Place/County 2000, 2010 Name of participant 
community,  
CRS class, credits earned, etc. 
2. Neighborhood Change 
Database (NCDB) from 
Geolytics, Inc. 
Tract 1970-2010, 
for census 
years 
Housing values, vacant 
housing,  
renters, non-migrants, etc. 
3. The Spatial Hazard Events 
and Loss Database for the 
United States (SHELDUS) 
County 1975-2010 Hazard type, damages, injuries, 
fatalities, etc. 
4. Flood Insurance Rate Maps 
from FEMA (2015)  
Flood zones  Current Base flood elevations, flood 
zones, floodplain boundaries, 
etc. 
5. Flood risk data from the 
United States Department of 
Transportation (US DOT) 
1km x 1km 
raster map, 
converted to 
census tract 
1996 Index value/minimum, 
maximum, mean by tract, etc. 
 
The third data source is Spatial Hazard Events and Losses Database for the United States 
(SHELDUS), which contains monthly flood damage data. SHELDUS contains county-level 
information to include location and date of hazard event, number of fatalities, property losses, 
injuries, etc. Although, this information is available for 18 different natural hazards, we use 
information on flood hazard only in the analyses. We assume that flood damages are distributed 
proportional to population among the tracts in a particular county. This assumption follows from 
the similarity in flood insurance claim rates (the share of policies that make a claim in a given 
year) occurring inside SFHAs versus outside (Kousky & Michel-Kerjan 2015). The fourth data 
source is the latest Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMS). The FIRMS provide tract-level 
information about SFHAs and the risk premium zones for 87% of the United States. The fifth 
data source is flood risk (raster) data from the United States Department of Transportation (US 
DOT) (1996). The information contained in the flood risk data is of very high resolution (1 km 
grid cell) and based on a ranking of flood risk (on a 0-100 scale) by FEMA as part of a study to 
assess the risks to pipelines from natural disasters including flooding.2  
 
  
                                                          
2 The USDOT flood risk data are converted from a 1km by 1km grid cell map onto census block groups, taking the 
mean value of the flood risk metric across the cells in each block group. Then, each census tract takes the mean 
value of these block groups’ flood risk value. This mean-mean aggregation function was just one of many 
alternatives tried (e.g., min-max, max-max, max-mean). The basic findings are not very sensitive to the aggregation 
choice. The mean-mean approach is used here as it is the most straightforward.  See the full report (US DOT 1996) 
for more details.  
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Table 2 
Variables and Their Descriptions. 
Variable Description Data Source 
Dependent (Development)   
New construction 
 
Share of houses built in the last five 
years in a tract 
NCDB (Geolytics) 
Mobile homes or trailers Percent housing units in a tract that are 
mobile homes or trailers 
NCDB (Geolytics) 
Dependent (Migration)   
Population growth Population of a tractt/population of a 
tractt-10  
NCDB (Geolytics) 
Non-movers Proportion of residents in the same 
house five years prior in a tract  
NCDB (Geolytics) 
Independent Variables   
CRS participation Dummy variable indicating tract 
resides in a community participating in 
the CRS 
FEMA (2017) 
Flood risk in CRS communities CRS participation * Flood risk FEMA (2017) and US 
DOT 
Flood zones in CRS 
communities  
CRS participation * SFHA share (share 
of a tract in a Special Flood Hazard 
Area) 
FEMA (2017) and FEMA 
(2015) 
Property damage per capita Total county flood damages within the 
previous five years/County population 
SHELDUS 
No flood prior Dummy variable indicating the tract 
lacked a flooding event within the 
previous five years 
SHELDUS 
Control Variables   
Poverty rate (lag) Tract poverty rate (10-year lag) NCDB (Geolytics) 
Mean housing value (lag) Log of mean housing value in a tract 
(10-year lag) 
NCDB (Geolytics) 
Population density (lag) Total tract population divided by total 
land area (10-year lag) 
NCDB (Geolytics) 
County non-movers (lag) Proportion of persons residing in the 
same county five years ago (10-year 
lag) 
NCDB (Geolytics) 
Unemployment rate (lag) Number of unemployed divided by 
total number in the labor force in a 
tract (10-year lag) 
NCDB (Geolytics) 
Renters (lag) Share of total housing units that are 
renter occupied in a tract (10-year lag) 
NCDB (Geolytics) 
Vacant homes (lag) Share of total housing units that are 
vacant in a tract (10-year lag) 
NCDB (Geolytics) 
Note:  All variables listed here enter the model at the tract level for year t, where t = 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010.  
Some variables are measured in year t (e.g., CRS participation, all dependent variables).  Flood event variables are 
measured using the previous five years (i.e., year t-5 through year t).  All ‘Control variables’ are measured at year t-
10 (i.e., with a ten-year lag). Thus, the control variables range in years from 1970-2000. Time invariant flood-related 
variables Flood risk and SFHA share are described in the text. 
 
4.2. Variables 
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The dependent variables of interest are development and migration (see Table 2). 
Development is measured in two ways: (1) New construction—share of houses built in the last 
five years, and (2) Mobile homes or trailers—share of housing units in a tract that are mobile 
homes or trailers. Both variables are calculated using housing variables that the decennial Census 
reports by simply dividing the count of the appropriate type of housing by all housing units in the 
tract. Similarly, we employ two measures of migration: (1) Population growth—Population of a 
tractt/population of a tractt-10, and (2) Non-movers—proportion of residents in the same house 5 
years prior in a tract. This latter variable is a measure directly reported in the decennial census. 
The analyses focus on the following independent variables: CRS participation, flood risk, 
flood risk in CRS communities, flood zones in CRS communities, property damage, and no flood 
prior. There are two options available with regard to CRS participation—communities are either 
participating or not participating in the CRS program. Those participating in the CRS in a given 
census year are coded 1, and 0 otherwise. Flood risk is measured as the mean flood risk from 
1km grid cells within a tract. The variable, flood risk, is omitted because it is time-invariant. 
Flood risk in CRS communities is the interaction term between Flood risk and CRS participation. 
This variable represents flood risk tracts in CRS-participating communities. The SFHA share 
represents the spatial extent of high-risk flood zones overlaying the tract for all tracts in the US 
for which digital FIRMs are available. Next, Flood zones in CRS communities is obtained by 
interacting CRS participation with SFHA share. This variable measures the percent of the tract's 
area covered by high-risk flood zones for tracts in CRS communities (coded 1; 0 otherwise). 
Although SFHA share is time invariant in these data, its interaction with CRS participation 
captures a differential effect of a tract’s 100-year floodplain exposure for tracts within CRS 
communities, which does vary over time. The benefit of including both CRS participation*Flood 
risk and CRS participation*SFHA share is to be able to distinguish between the richer, more 
continuous measure of flood risk (Flood Risk) and the more limited (Brody, Blessing, Sebastian, 
& Bedient, 2012) binary notion of flood risk that maps directly onto flood insurance 
requirements and CRS discounts. Using only one would further mix risk and insurance or policy 
effects, while including both allows us to differentiate between extant flood risk and officially 
regulated flood zones. Thus, although the main effect of the CRS indicates the average effect of 
CRS participation across the community irrespective of the tract’s flood risks, the interaction 
terms pick up whether CRS participation is different in tracts that are more in floodplains or have 
greater flood risks. Property damage per capita is measured as the total flood damage in a 
county over the previous five years divided by the county population. No flood prior is measured 
as the absence of at least one flooding event in a tract within the last five years.  Thus, both flood 
event and damage variables draw from the detailed SHELDUS data from the previous five years 
(e.g., 1985-1990 for t=1990). 
To isolate the effect of the independent variables on the dependent variables, we include 
the following control variables: poverty rate, mean housing value, population density, county 
non-movers, unemployment rate, renters, and vacant homes. Poverty rate is measured as the tract 
poverty rate. Mean housing value is measured as the log of mean housing value in a tract. We 
measure population density as the total tract population divided by total land area. County non-
movers is the proportion of persons residing in the same county five years ago. Furthermore, 
unemployment rate is measured as the number of unemployed divided by total number in the 
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labor force. Renters is the share of total housing units that are rentals, and vacant is measured as 
the share of total housing units that are vacant. All these control variables enter as lagged to the 
previous census year (i.e., a 10-year lag) in order to avoid simultaneity concerns. Although we 
drop 13% of all tracts due to missing FIRM data, missing values for socioeconomic controls like 
unemployment rate and housing value further reduce the sample size. The FE regressions use 
62,537 tracts, or almost 86% of all 2010 tracts, with FIRMs and when they have nonmissing 
NCDB data.3 
 
5.  Results 
 
We discuss a few notable descriptive statistics presented in Table 3. On average, about 
10% of homes are new construction, 6% are mobile homes or trailers, and 61% of the population 
are non-movers. In any given census year, approximately 10% of tracts are participating in the 
CRS, a figure that rises to 17.8% if the sample is restricted to 2000 and 2010 after the CRS 
program began. The average mean risk for all the tracts is about 42 on a scale of 0-100. Tracts 
average about 12% of their area being in a SFHA. In addition, about 16% of tracts in a county 
have not experienced a flood within the last five years. The mean unemployment rate is 
approximately 6%, 31% of residents are renters, and 8% of homes are vacant. 
 
Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics. 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max4 
Dependent Variables  
New construction 216,984 0.103 0.141 0 1 
Mobile homes or trailers 216,984 0.063 0.111 0 1 
Population growth 216,979 1.864 27.450 0 4,758 
Non-movers 216,899 0.611 0.198 0 1 
Independent Variables  
CRS participation 216,984 0.102 0.302 0 1 
Flood risk in CRS communities 216,984 3.960 14.764 0 99 
Flood risk 216,984 41.914 27.636 0 99 
                                                          
3 To examine the sensitivity of the results to dropping tracts without digital FIRM data available, multiple 
imputation regression techniques are applied to the four models in Table 4. Using variables in Table 2 and especially 
information from the raster flood hazard maps (which cover all tracts) to impute CRS participation*SFHA share 
over 20 imputations, the estimates in Table 4 can be compared to results where the SFHA share variable is imputed 
and no longer missing for a sizeable portion of the country. The full results, available on request, show minimal 
change to the coefficients of interest and even to the SFHA share coefficient. The only exception is for the CRS 
participation*Flood risk parameter, which becomes marginally insignificant in the new construction model. 
    
4 The decennial census uses tract boundaries that change every decade. In order to keep our units of analysis 
constant through the five decades examined in this study, we use the NCDB, for which Geolytics has reestimated 
Census variables from previous census years to match them to the 2010 tract boundaries. While the NCDB offers a 
key advantage of normalizing Census data so that our geographic units of analysis are fixed through time, their 
estimation process can result in some percentage or share variables exceeding 1.0 (especially for much older data, 
such as 1970, when the whole country was not yet mapped to Census tracts). In our sample, four tract-years have 
estimated values for Renters or Vacant homes that exceed unity in the NCDB. Similarly, Geolytics imputation and 
estimation processes to create the NCDB is also the reason for the unusual descriptive statistics for the population 
growth variable. The median of Population growth is 1.065. 
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Flood zones in CRS communities 216,984 0.014 0.081 0 1 
SFHA share 216,984 0.116 0.186 0 1 
Control Variables 
Property damage ($) 216,984 51.300 906.411 0 66,208.33 
No flood prior 216,984 0.155 0.362 0 1 
Poverty rate 216,984 0.120 0.105 0 1 
Mean housing value ($) 216,984 10.934 1.047 -7.099 14.174 
Population density 216,984 0.002 0.004 0 0.082 
County non-movers 216,984 0.769 0.139 0 1 
Unemployment rate 216,984 0.060 0.047 0 1 
Renters 216,984 0.309 0.204 0 2 
Vacant homes 216,984 0.078 0.081 0 1.5 
 
Table 4 presents the results of four tract-level FE models for new construction, mobile 
homes or trailers, population growth, and non-movers. The results of the new construction model 
indicate a negative and significant relationship between new construction and CRS participation. 
Specifically, there is a 1.8% decrease in new construction in CRS tracts holding all other 
variables constant. Similarly, there is a significant and negative relationship between new 
construction and flood risk in CRS communities. On the contrary, there is a significant and 
positive relationship between new construction and flood zones in CRS communities. In 
addition, there is a positive and significant relationship between new construction and property 
damage as well as between new construction and no flood prior.  
A look at the mobile homes or trailers model shows a negative and significant 
relationship between CRS participation and the construction of mobile homes or trailers. The 
relationships between construction of mobile homes or trailers and flood risk in CRS 
communities, flood zones in CRS communities, property damage, and no flood prior are all 
insignificant.  
According to the population growth model, there is a negative and significant association 
between participating in the CRS and population growth. Similarly, there is a negative and 
significant relationship between flood zones in CRS participating communities and population 
growth. These results are contrary to that of flood risk in CRS communities, which indicates a 
positive and significant association with population growth. Further, there is a positive and 
significant relationship between population growth and property damage, and a negative and 
significant association between population growth and no flood prior.  
Finally, the results of the non-movers model indicate a 2.6 percentage-point increase in 
the proportion of non-movers in CRS tracts holding all other variables constant. Further 
examination into this model’s results shows a negative and significant relationships between 
non-movers and the following three variables; flood risk in CRS communities, property damage, 
and no flood prior. The relationship between non-movers and flood zones in CRS communities is 
negative and insignificant. 
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Table 4 
Fixed-Effects Regression Results for New construction, Mobile homes or trailers, Population 
growth, and Non-movers. 
 
New 
construction 
Mobile homes 
or trailers 
Population 
growth 
Non-movers 
Variable Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
CRS participation -0.018*** -0.005*** -2.754*** 0.026***   
Flood risk in CRS 
communities 
-0.0001** -0.00002 0.039*** -0.0001*** 
Flood zones in CRS 
communities  
0.012** -0.004 -1.740* -0.006    
Property damage 5.378e-07*** -4.662e-09 0.0001*** -5.224e-07*** 
No flood prior 0.003*** 0.0001 -0.896*** -0.009*** 
Poverty rate 0.357*** 0.018***   13.102* -0.047***   
Mean housing value -0.004*** -0.008***   4.373*** 0.010***   
Population density -28.573*** -0.957*** 128.506 26.646*** 
 
County non-movers 0.002 -0.001 20.420*** 0.089*** 
Unemployment rate 0.113*** 0.059*** 146.941*** -0.041*** 
Renters -0.139*** -0.026***   33.268*** -0.033***   
Vacant homes 0.093*** -0.025*** 95.773*** -0.251*** 
1980 0.130***     0.005***  9.186*** -0.317***   
1990 0.086*** 0.012***   1.429*** -0.309*** 
2000 0.059*** 0.010*** -0.922***     -0.293***   
2010 Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted 
N 216,984           216,984           216,979 216,899 
F 3,111.2 273.1 10.6 43,253.9 
    (p-value)    p<0.0001    p<0.0001    p<0.0001    p<0.0001 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.298 0.034 0.079 0.818 
Note: *p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
6. Discussion 
 
Our analyses take advantage of two features of the empirical setting to identify policy 
effects of the CRS program on migration and development. This is particularly important for a 
program like the CRS, where participation is voluntary and endogeneity may weaken the results. 
First, we take advantage of natural and exogenous measures of flood risk as well as detailed 
historical records of local flood damage. Second, we construct a panel of census tracts 
nationwide that includes participating and non-participating CRS communities, including those 
that joined the program recently. Roughly speaking, this approach allows us to examine changes 
in migration and housing development trends across CRS participants and non-participants. 
 We now focus our attention to discussing the results of the four models. With regard to 
the impact of CRS participation on new housing development, the results of the new construction 
model suggest that there is a decrease in the share of new construction of houses in tracts located 
in CRS participating communities in comparison to the same tracts prior to joining the CRS. This 
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result provides empirical evidence in support of Hypothesis 1a, and is supported by the 
environmental information disclosure literature (Beierle, 2004; Finger & Gamper-Rabindran, 
2013). Similarly, flood-prone tracts within CRS participating communities also experienced even 
lower new housing construction in comparison to those same flood-prone tracts before they 
joined the CRS. Contrary to the two previous results, flood zones within CRS tracts seem to 
attract new construction of houses. This finding is corroborated by several previous studies (e.g., 
Bagstad et al., 2007; Burby, 2001; Chakraborty et al., 2014; Cordes & Yezer, 1998). This 
increase in new housing construction in flood zones may be the result of the availability of 
higher flood insurance discounts for SFHAs relative to CRS tracts outside of SFHAs 
(Chakraborty et al., 2014). This study is unable to ascertain whether these new houses in the 
floodplain are elevated in compliance with the NFIP requirements or not. Calculated at mean 
values, the effect of CRS participation is a 1.85 percentage point reduction in the new 
construction share. This effect remains negative (-0.0064) even for a tract completely within an 
SFHA, and would grow to a 2.70 percentage point reduction in new construction share for tracts 
with Flood Risk of 99 (and SFHA share at the mean). The offsetting effects of extant flood risk 
and official flood zones in CRS communities suggests nuanced pressures on new construction, 
with perhaps the new construction more likely in low-risk areas with some proximity to (better 
managed due to CRS participation) flood zones.  
With regards to property damage, the more property damage from floods, the higher the 
share of new construction. Similarly, there is a positive relationship between the fact that there 
was no flooding event within the previous five years and the share of new construction. In other 
words, the share of new housing construction increases with more property damage and with 
more years without a flood. The effect is modest, with a standard deviation increase in Property 
damage associated with a 0.1 percentage point increase in the share of new construction in a 
tract.  These results make sense in the context of the earlier result that shows an increase in new 
construction of houses in flood zones in CRS communities. One would expect to see an increase 
in new housing development after a disaster as the community moves to rebuild completely 
destroyed homes. Furthermore, it is expected that a community would build new homes in areas 
that have not experienced a flood within the last five years. The implication of this result is that 
communities might be using a lack of previous flood in an area as an indication that the area is 
not prone to flooding. This could create a false sense of security if a community’s decision to 
build in an area is solely based on this criterion.  
The results of the mobile homes or trailers model indicate that there is less construction 
of mobile homes or trailers in tracts located in CRS participating communities in comparison to 
those same tracts prior to joining the CRS. Calculated for a typical tract in the CRS (with mean 
Flood risk = 38.9, mean SFHA share = 0.139), the effect of CRS participation is a 0.66 
percentage point decrease in the share of mobile homes or trailers. These results provide 
evidence in support of Hypothesis 2a, and suggest that the CRS may be discouraging the 
construction of mobile homes or trailers within participating communities. This result is also in 
line with the arguments of proponents of the environmental information disclosure that when a 
community is aware of environmental risks, it is more likely to make safer and better decisions 
(Beierle, 2004; Finger & Gamper-Rabindran, 2013). 
According to the population growth model, there is a decrease in population growth rates 
in tracts located in CRS participating communities in comparison to growth rates prior to joining 
the CRS. Hence, Hypothesis 1a is supported. Conversely, flood-prone tracts in CRS communities 
experienced an increase in population growth, while flood zones in CRS communities saw a 
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decrease in population growth. These results suggest that the CRS is discouraging population 
growth in tracts located in CRS participating communities and in flood zones after joining the 
CRS. The effect of CRS participation, when calculated at average risk values among CRS-
participating tracts, is a -1.46, a substantially lower growth rate. Yet among higher flood risk 
tracts (i.e., Flood risk > 76, when holding SFHA share fixed at 0.139), the CRS effect on 
population growth can become positive. These results help to accentuate the effect of the CRS on 
population growth by contrasting the increase in population growth in flood risk areas with the 
decrease in population growth in floodplains. The implication of this result is that the reduction 
in population growth in CRS participating communities may be occurring as a result of the CRS 
preventing people from living in flood-prone areas within those communities. This is what we 
refer to as the “scarecrow” effect. In doing so, the CRS is helping communities increase their 
resilience to future flood events–a fundamental goal of the CRS program. In addition, the results 
show a positive relationship between population growth and recent property damage from 
flooding. As new construction also increases with recent flooding and property damage, 
population grows faster with recent damaging floods. There is more new building, and more 
residents, after these flood disasters.5 Finally, the negative relationship between population 
growth and no flood prior indicates a sharp decline in growth rates in counties avoiding recent 
flood disasters relative to areas experiencing little flood property damage. This effect is 
consistent with counties with rarer flood events (i.e., lower density, lower population counties) 
growing slower. This draws attention to the possibility that the SHELDUS data captures flood 
disasters and some flood events may not result in damages substantial enough to be recorded in 
SHELDUS.  
With regards to non-movers, tracts within CRS communities are increasing their share of 
non-movers relative to before joining the CRS. Calculated at average Flood risk and SFHA share 
in the CRS, the effect of CRS participation is a 2.1 percentage point increase in the share of non-
movers. This result supports Hypothesis 3a, and suggests that if residents of CRS communities 
are staying more, they may not be able to explore economic opportunities outside of their 
communities as researchers have found that the higher the proportion of non-movers in a 
country, the higher the poverty level (e.g., Rupasingha & Goetz, 2007). Furthermore, another 
result suggests that the CRS deters non-movers in flood-prone tracts. Taking both results 
together, it appears that the CRS is encouraging people to stay in tracts located in CRS 
participating communities in comparison to those same tracts prior to joining the CRS. More 
importantly, this positive effect of CRS on staying is diminished for households in risky areas 
within participant communities. (The share of non-movers might typically grow by 2.6 
percentage points after joining the CRS for a lower-risk tract, but average non-mover growth is 
only 1.5 percentage points for the riskiest tract.)  The negative relationship between non-movers 
and property damage suggests that people tend to migrate from an area that is devastated by 
flood events. This result is consistent with several studies that demonstrated that migration is an 
                                                          
5 Causal interpretations here are complicated by at least two important limitations of the data. First, the population 
growth variable refers to growth from year t-10 to year t, while property damage refers to damage from year t-5 to 
year t. Growth in those first five years (t-10 to t-5) could lead to more property exposed to flood risk and increase 
the likelihood and expected amount of such a flood disaster. Second, because the property damage from SHELDUS 
is measured at the county level (and only normalized to the tract-level in per-capita Property damage), it is possible 
that a severe flood event is concentrated in only a handful of tracts in a particular county. If this displaces population 
to many nearby tracts within the same county, then population growth will be positive for most observations and 
negative for a few, while Property damage is positive for all of them. This displacement could give the appearance 
of a positive Property damage effect because the damage value is available only at the county level. 
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adaptation mechanism for coping with disasters and climate change (Husby et al., 2014; Kahn, 
2015; Portnykh, 2014; Richert, Erdlenbruch, & Figuieres, 2017). Finally, the negative 
relationship between non-movers and no flood prior suggests that individuals are migrating from 
areas that have not experienced a flood event. Tracts in counties experiencing five flood-free 
years tend to see more residential turnover in those years, perhaps as areas with more sporadic 
flooding discourage stable populations. It is also plausible that there have been prior floods in 
such areas, but the damages caused are not substantial enough to be captured by SHELDUS.  
 
7.  Conclusion 
 
Floods continue to wreak havoc on ecological and human systems (Jonkman, 2005; Sadiq & 
Noonan, 2015a). Amid a growing concern of climate change impacts, these systems could be 
devastated further (Botzen et al., 2009; IPCC, 2013). Understanding and improving flood 
management at the community scale is important in order to reduce the vulnerability of human 
societies to floods. Although, researchers have studied flood-risk management policy at the 
community scale, this literature has largely overlooked analyzing the impact of a flood-risk 
management policy on migration and development, especially at a refined geographic scale. 
This study examines the impact of the CRS on migration and development. The CRS 
program was created in 1990 to enable communities to voluntarily reduce flood risks, and in 
return, receive discounted flood insurance premiums. Although reducing flood risk is a primary 
objective of the CRS, the second-order effects on economic activity like migration and 
development are crucial to fully assessing the net effects of the CRS on ecological and human 
systems. Despite the myriad studies on the CRS, the effect of subsidizing community-level flood 
management on migration and development patterns remains unstudied. Hence, the current study 
is the first to empirically investigate the effect of the CRS program on migration and 
development patterns. In general, the results indicate that the CRS discourages new housing 
developments and the construction of mobile homes or trailers in participating communities. In 
addition, the CRS discourages population growth, especially in floodplains, as well as migration 
out of CRS participating communities.   
Although, our study provides critical insights on the impact of the CRS program on 
migration and development, further inquiries are warranted. First, our analyses focused on five 
Census years, and excluded the years in between Censuses. Future studies should consider 
including intercensal years in their analyses, which would allow for more short-term adaptations 
to be detected. Secondly, there are other determinants of the CRS that were not controlled for 
such as flood insurance demand (Dixon et al., 2006; Zahran et al., 2009) and flood insurance 
claims (Kousky & Michel-Kerjan, 2015). Future research should endeavor to build upon our 
study by including these and other omitted, but relevant control variables. Third, it is imperative 
to know whether the increased construction of new housing in the floodplain observed in this 
study is elevated in compliance with the NFIP requirements (Burby, 2001). The current study is 
not able to ascertain this. As such, future studies should extend our work by determining whether 
or not the new houses developed in floodplains are in compliance with NFIP regulations. Fourth, 
the study employed a time-invariant measure of flood risk. A time-varying measure of flood risk 
would allow for the effects of CRS on flood risk to be differentiated from its other effects. We 
therefore recommend future research to use a time-varying measure of flood risk. Similarly, 
more localized measures of flood damage would shed more light on recovery and resilience 
beyond what our limited measure can tell us. Finally, we recognize that the CRS might have 
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some welfare effects. However, an investigation of this possibility is beyond the scope of this 
study. Therefore, we recommend that future studies examine the welfare effects of participating 
in the CRS program. Despite these limitations, we are confident that this national-level study will 
benefit both academics and practitioners by helping to illuminate the impacts of the CRS 
program on migration and development, and in doing so, increase our understanding of the 
effects of community-scale flood risk management on ecological and human systems.  
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